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PROXIES FOR LOYALTY IN CONSTITUTIONAL




I want to share with you some thoughts about using citizenship and
race as proxies for loyalty in constitutional immigration discourse
within two contexts: one historical and one current. The current con-
text is the profiling of Muslim and Arab immigrants post-September
11, and the historical context is the distinction the Constitution draws
between birthright and naturalized citizens in the Presidential Eligibil-
ity Clause.
II. PROXIES FOR DISLOYALTY: MUSLIM AND ARAB
NONCITIZENS POST-SEPTEMBER 11
The American Heritage Dictionary defines "loyal" as "steadfast in
allegiance to one's homeland, government, or sovereign."' As with
any vague and ambiguous term, "loyal" might be best understood by
way of example: The President of a nation is expected to be "loyal" to
that nation; a terrorist, in contrast, is not. Post-September 11, we have
been duly concerned with the second, negative example with those
who might be dangerously disloyal, those willing to give up their own
lives in order to harm the United States and things "American."
This search for the next terrorist has affected many of us most pro-
foundly in the context of airport security. In an ideal world, perhaps,
there would be a "terrorist screening device" through which all airport
passengers would have to pass; it would search not only the person's
* Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State University. B.A. Swarthmore; J.D., University of
Southern California. This Article grows out of remarks I gave at the DePaul Law Review's 2002
Symposium: I thank Mary Ann Becker, Craig Mousin, Kevin Johnson. and Gil Gott for organiz-
ing this excellent event and for inviting me to participate. I thank Yung, Peggy. and Jake Lim
for their hospitality during my visit to Chicago. I would also like to thank Kevin Johnson and
Susan Akram for useful advice on an early draft of this piece: Jen DeMichael for her invaluable
research assistance: Peter Glenn for the award of a summer research grant: and most especially,
my wife. Corie, my children, Ryan and Julia. and my family in the Philippines for their constant
love and support. All errors that remain are mine alone.
1. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY 745 (2d College ed. 1985).
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belongings for potentially dangerous weapons, but would also unerr-
ingly read the passenger's mind to determine whether he or she plans
to hijack the next flight-a souped-up "lie-detector test," if you will.
Despite our twenty-first century advances, we have no such gadget
(nor is any looming on the technological horizon) 2 and we often settle
for second-best solutions such as using race and citizenship as proxies
for (dis)loyalty. When we use race and citizenship this way, we ask
whether there is a particular kind of person who is disloyal, or a "dis-
loyal type." In considering the utility of these factors, it might be
helpful to look at analogous efforts by criminologists and sociologists
to determine whether there is a classifiable "criminal type."
According to sociologist Jessica Mitford, prior to the end of the
nineteenth century, people believed that the Devil was the cause of
2. Among the different technologies currently being developed are advanced explosive and
trace metal detection machines, facial recognition systems, and fingerprint identification devices.
See Karen Kaplan, Fighting Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20. 2001, at T1, available at 2001 WL
2519398: Guy Gugliotta, Tech Companies See Market for Detection, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2001,
at A8, available at 2001 WL 28360472 ("For several years, cutting-edge identification and detec-
tion technologies have helped specialists in the battle against terrorism, but the Sept. 11 attacks
on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center could transform these once exotic gadgets into
everyday tools of airport safety."). Despite these developments, and recent non-technological
advances aimed at fortifying airport security such as random screenings and covert military pres-
ence, flying is still not as safe as it could be. See, e.g., Romesh Ratnesar, How Safe Now?, TIME,
May 27, 2002. at 34-35:
The congressional mandate to install 2.200 explosive-detection devices in all 429 air-
ports by the end of the year has been scaled down: the new Transportation Security
Administration does plan to buy almost 5,000 trace-detection devices. The TSA is hav-
ing trouble recruiting more than 400,000 new screeners. So far, government- trained
screeners have taken up positions in exactly one airport.
Id.
See also Richard Zoglin & Sally B. Donnelly. Welcome to Americas Best-Run Airport (And Why
It's Still Not Good Enough), TIME, July 15, 2002, at 22, 26-27 (noting that despite Denver Inter-
national Airport's heightened security post-9/l., imperfections still exist in policies involving the
profiling of passengers, bag matching. technology, luggage screeners, forgotten cargo, perimeter
security, and crowd control). Perhaps a more important flaw is the government's inability to act
quickly and decisively on intelligence. See, e.g., Michael Elliott. How the U.S. Missed the Clues,
TIME, May 27, 2002, at 25 ("Everyone-inside the Bush administration as well as outside it-
knew there had been massive failures of intelligence in the period before the [September It]
attacks.").
Of course, the terrorist threat extends well beyond securing the nation's airports. Political
scientist Jessica Stern predicts that the most serious post-Cold War terrorist threat will come
from the use of weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, chemical, and biological. See JESSICA
STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS 10 (1999):
While the probability of [weapons of mass destruction] terrorism is low, its expected
cost-in lives lost and in threats to civil liberties-is potentially devastating. Govern-
ment officials will be remiss-and will be blamed-if they do not take measures to
reduce the likelihood and severity of the threat.
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crime. 3 She explains, however, that in the late 1800s, Cesare Lom-
broso, an Italian criminologist, insisted that criminals were born and
could be identified by distinct physical and mental characteristics. 4
Lombroso contended that "criminals have long, large, protruding ears,
abundant hair, thin beard, prominent frontal sinuses, protruding chin,
[and] large cheekbones."'5 Mitford asserts that during the twentieth
century, efforts to identify the criminal type persisted, but with bewil-
dering results.6
Mitford argues that obtaining a more realistic view of the criminal
type requires examining the composition of the prison population. 7
She explains that "[t]oday the prisons are filled with the young, the
poor white, the black, the Chicano, [and] the Puerto Rican."" Mitford
opines that the reason certain groups are disproportionately repre-
3. See JESSICA MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENI: THE PRISON BUSINESS 46 (1973),
reprinted in THE DILEMMAS OF CORREC-rIONS 21 (Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds.,
3d ed. 1995). 1 thank my research assistant, Jen DeMichael, for conceiving of and drafting most
of this section on criminal typing.
4. Id., reprinted in THE DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS 21 (Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey P.
Alpert eds., 3d ed. 1995). Lombroso also determined that criminals were a "subspecies." Id.,
reprinted in THE DIi EMMAS OF CORRECTIONS 21 (Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds..
3d ed. 1995). At around the same time. French scientist Louis Agassiz, who was tapped to estab-
lish a new school of medical study at Harvard. subscribed to the belief that persons of African
descent were less intelligent than Caucasians because they had smaller skulls. Agassiz had been
introduced to the work of Philadelphia physician Samuel Morton who advocated skull measure-
ment as a basis of divining intelligence. Morton's work gave scientific credence to what were
apparently Agassiz's prejudices against people of color. See Louis MENAND, THE MEIAPHYSI -
CAL CLUB 97-116 (2001). The most recent (infamous) incarnation of the race- intelligence link
came during the 1990s with the publication of The Bell Curve. See RICHARD J. HERRNSrEIN &
CHARLES MURRAY. THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS SmRUCrURE IN AMERICAN
LIFE (1994).
5. MiITORD, supra note 3, at 47, reprinted in THE DILEMMAS OF CORREC I IONS 21 (Kenneth
C. Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 3d ed. 1995). Mitford indicates, however, that not everyone
found Lombroso's work to be convincing. She notes that a skeptical English physician named
Charles Goring studied the physical characteristics of three thousand prisoners by measuring
their noses, ears. eyebrows and chins. Goring compared these results with the measurements of
English university students and failed to find any evidence of a physical criminal type. Id., re-
printed in Tit- Dii EMNMAS OF CORRECTIONS 22 (Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 3d
ed. 1995).
6. Id., reprinted in THE DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS 22 (Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey P.
Alpert eds.. 3d ed. 1995). For example. she writes that the German criminologist Gustav Aschaf-
fenburg determined that people who are stout and squat with large abdomens (the "pyknic
type") tend to be occasional offenders, while those persons who are slender with slight muscular
development (the "asthenic type") are more often found to be habitual offenders. Id., reprinted
in THE DILEMMAS OF CORREC IONS 22 (Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds.. 3d ed.
1995).
7. Mi FORD. supra note 3. at 50. reprinted in THE DILEMMAS OF CORRCr'IONS 23 (Kenneth
C. Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds.. 3d ed. 1995).
8. Id.. reprinted in THE DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS 23-24 (Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey P.
Alpert eds.. 3d ed. 1995). Mitford further notes that in the past. the criminal type that filled the
nation's prisons included poor Native Americans as well as Irish and Italian immigrants. Id.,
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sented in prisons and jails is that the only crimes available to the poor
are those that are easily detected such as theft, robbery, and purse
snatching.9 She also points to Professor Theodore Sarbin's suggestion
that the police are conditioned to treat certain classes of people-cur-
rently people of color, but formerly immigrants-as potentially more
dangerous than others.10 She contends that in the American criminal
justice system, a white person is more likely to be dismissed with a
warning, but an African American is more likely to be arrested and
imprisoned. 1 Mitford concludes, "Thus it seems safe to assert that
there is indeed a criminal type-but he is not a biological, anatomical,
phrenological, or anthropological type; rather, he is a social creation,
etched by the dominant class and ethnic prejudices of a given
society."' 2
Mitford's analysis rings true when we examine the less-than-careful
finger pointing that ensued during the recently launched war on ter-
rorism. In the days and weeks following 9-11, both the public and
pundits alike approved of profiling airport passengers based on immu-
table characteristics such as race and national origin.13 A TIME/CNN
reprinted in THE DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS 24 (Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds..
3d ed. 1995).
9. Id. at 52, reprinted in THE DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS 25-26 (Kenneth C. Haas & Geof-
frey P. Alpert eds., 3d ed. 1995).
10. Id. at 53, reprinted in THE DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS 26 (Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey
P. Alpert eds.. 3d ed. 1995). Mitford examines a 1970 study by a sociology class at the University
of California at Los Angeles. A dozen students with perfect driving records were selected for the
experiment. The students were told to drive as they normally did, but with phosphorescent
bumper stickers reading "Black Panther Party" attached to their cars. Mitford explains that in
the first seventeen days of the study, the students accumulated thirty driving citations such as
failure to signal and improper lane changes. The author goes on to write that "[t]wo students
had to withdraw from the experiment after two days because their licenses were suspended: and
the project soon had to be abandoned because the $1,000 appropriation for the experiment had
been used up in paying bails and fines of the participants." Id.
11. MITFORD, supra note 3, at 56, reprinted in THE DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS 28 (Kenneth
C. Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 3d ed. 1995).
12. Id.
13. Ironically, pre-September 11, there was a growing distaste for racial profiling; among
others, President Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft spoke out against the practice. Susan
Akram & Kevin Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001:
The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. LAW 295, 351 (2003). "9-
11" quickly reversed that trend with persons of apparent Arab or Muslim background ques-
tioned and, as described below, detained for possible links to terrorism. Id. at 352-55. In June
2002, five men filed civil rights lawsuits against several airlines asserting they were wrongly re-
moved from flights based solely on their appearance. See, e.g., Susan Sachs. Five Passengers Say
Airlines Discriminated by Looks, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at B4, available at http://www.ny-
times.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2003): Lawsuits Accuse 4 Airlines of Bias, WASH. POST, June 5.
2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 21749405: Deborah Barfield Barry, Lawsuits Target Airlines,
NEWSDAY, June 5. 2002. at A16. available at 2002 WL 2746989. For more -n the "Arabs as
terrorists" phenomenon. see, e.g., Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, f9 ASIAN L. REV.
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poll from the fall of 2001 revealed that fifty-seven percent of all
Americans were willing to allow the government to discriminate on
the basis of race, gender, and age during airport searches. 14 And the
government has breathed life into this sentiment. As Professors Susan
Akram and Kevin Johnson carefully detail in their recent article, 15
thousands of Muslim and Arab immigrants have been detained and
questioned by federal authorities, all without producing any direct evi-
dence of their terrorist affiliation. Even those skeptical that race and
citizenship profiling might work have argued that, on balance, it
should be used discreetly. As Michael Kinsley, editor of the cyberzine
Slate, contends: "But assuming [racial profiling works], it's hard to ar-
gue that helping to avoid another September 11 is not worth the impo-
sition, which is pretty small: inconvenience and embarrassment, as
opposed to losing a job or getting lynched."1 6 Newsweek columnist
1575 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the
"Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2001); Adrien K. Wing, Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Critical Race Perspective. 31 COLUM. HUM.
Ris. L. REV. 561 (2000); Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and
United States Antiterrorism Legislation. 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825 (2001).
Kevin Johnson predicts that with continuing immigration from Latin America and Asia, more
domestic civil rights controversies at the intersection of race and immigration will likely emerge.
See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of" Civil Rights " As We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights
in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1482 ("With a growing foreign-born population,
comprised predominantly of people of color, joining established minority communities in this
country, new and different civil rights issues have emerged and will continue to do so for the
foreseeable future."). Indeed, the Justice Department's recent legal ruling to allow the INS to
supplement its forces with state police might lead to more clashes between immigrants and law
enforcement. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Ruling Clears Way to Use State Police in Immigration Duty,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 2002. at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2002)
("'This would leverage a small number of federal law enforcement officers with much, much
larger numbers of state and local police officers,' said Mark Krikorian, executive director of the
Center for Immigration Studies, which advocates stricter limits on immigration."); Noteworthy,
79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 388 (2002) ("Florida police and the INS are working on a memoran-
dum of understanding (MOU) that would allow 35 police officers to become deputized immigra-
tion officers under an obscure provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). The MOU will need approval from the Attorney
General.").
14. Daniel Eisenberg, How Safe Can We Get?, TIME. Sept. 24, 2001. at 88 (describing TIME/
CNN poll in which 57% deemed "acceptable" the use of "profiling by age, race and gender to
identify potentially suspicious passengers").
15. Akram & Johnson, supra note 13. at 331-41. See also Somini Sengupta, Ill-Fated Path to
America, Jail and Death. N.Y. TIMEs. Nov. 5, 2001, at Al. available at http://www.nvtimes.com
(last visited Feb. 12, 2002) (noting that since September 11, over 1100 people have been picked
up by law enforcement authorities and that approximately two hundred of those people have
been held by the INS solely for violations of United States immigration laws).
16. Michael Kinsley, Discrimination We're Afraid to Be Against. 12 THE RESPONSIVE COMMU-
NITY. Winter 2001-02. at 64, 66 [hereinafter Kinsley. Discrimination]: see also Michael Kinsley,
When Is Racial Profiling Okay?. WASH. POST. Sept. 30. 2001. at B7 [hereinafter Kinslev. Racial
Profiling] (contending that racial profiling at airport security checkpoints might be acceptable).
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Stuart Taylor adds that while he generally believes racial profiling to
be deplorable,
I think people getting on airliners [is] a very special case. Unless
you can thoroughly search everyone, which would be great, but it
would take hours and hours and hours, it makes sense to search
with special care those people who look like all of the mass murder
suicide hijackers who did the deeds on September 11.17
Supporters of this view believe this to be an objective cost-benefit
analysis. There is great benefit to preventing another terrorist attack
and the cost to the innocent individual is minuscule, and certainly, not
the same as losing a job or getting lynched.
A. Comparing 9/11 and 12/7
Or being interned in a wartime camp. In United States v. Kore-
matsu, a majority of the Supreme Court upheld the internment of
mostly U.S. citizens of Japanese descent, partly for the reasons that
Taylor articulates. The Court was unwilling to substitute its judgment
Cf Stanley Crouch. Drawing the Line on Racial Profiling, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 4, 2001, at 41
(asserting that the current profiling of Arab Americans is different from profiling African Amer-
icans): Dorothy Rabinowitz. Hijacking History. WALL Si. J.. Dec. 7, 2001. at A18 (contending
that profiling Arab Americans is not the same as the forms of racial profiling that were used in
the past). See also Ronald J. Sievert. Meeting the Twenty-First Century Terrorist Threat Within
the Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional Law. 37 Hous. L. REv. 1421. 1454 (2000):
If. for example, England. Iran. or Latvia were either to enter into a shooting war with
the United States or to initiate a campaign of terrorism against our nation, no one
would seriously content that all individuals of English. Iranian. or Latvian ancestry
were terrorists .... This does not mean, however, that law enforcement officers would
be engaging in illegal profiling or racism if they considered an individual's English.
Iranian, or Latvian ancestry as one factor, among others, in deciding who to interview.,
stop, or search. In fact, it could be argued that officers were acting irresponsibly if they
did not note a suspects ancestry while attempting to protect a nation in the midst of
such a violent conflict between the different societies.
Id. As one airport screener admitted to TIME magazine reporters:
For me, profiling is the only way to be conscientious in doing the job. I make decisions
based on who I wouldn't like to be seated next to on an airplane. If someone is un-
kempt and nervous or if they look like they belong on a bus instead of a plane. if they
wear a baseball cap backwards and, without question. if they look to be foreign or of
Middle Eastern descent.
Zoglin & Donnelly. supra note 2. at 22. When asked about whether he would be suspicious of
African Americans, the screener replied that that would be discrimination. Id. Recently, a
plane carrying an Indian actress and her family suspected of being terrorists was escorted to
LaGuardia airport by military fighter jets. The family's suspicious conduct? Upon seeing the
famous New York skyline for the first time. family members chatted excitedly about the sights,
changing seats so each could have a peek through the window. A nervous passenger reported
this conduct that was then relayed to airport authorities, leading to the jet fighter escorts. See
Lydia Polgreen, Bolly'wood Farce: Indian Actress and Family Are Detained. N.Y. TIMES. July 18.
2002. at BI, available at http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
17. PBS On-Line Newshour, Profile of A Terrorist, Sept. 26. 2001, at http://www.pbs.org/new-
shour/bb/terrorism/July-dec0l/racial profile.html (last visited Mar. 4. 2003).
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for the military's about the possibility of a West Coast invasion by
Japan.' But as Justice John L. Murphy pointed out in dissent, the
underlying rhetoric employed by the internment camps' chief en-
forcer, General Frank DeWitt, sounded more in stereotypical concep-
tions of who might be disloyal than in statistical fact:' 9
Further evidence of the Commanding General's attitude toward in-
dividuals of Japanese ancestry is revealed in his voluntary testimony
on April 13, 1943, in San Francisco before the House Naval Affairs
Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas: . . . "I don't want
any of them (persons of Japanese ancestry) here. They are a dan-
gerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty. The
west coast contains too many vital installations essential to the de-
fense of the country to allow any Japanese on this coast .... The
danger of the Japanese was, and is now-if they are permitted to
come back-espionage and sabotage. It makes no difference
whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American
citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty .... But we must
worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.
Sabotage and espionage will make problems as long as he is allowed
in this area .... 20
While admittedly, interning Japanese Americans is not the same as
asking Arab noncitizens more questions at the airport, the underlying
rhetoric is surprisingly similar. During World War II, as now, the pub-
lic and government were willing to use proxies for disloyalty as a
means to safeguard national security, despite the cost to innocent per-
sons swept into the dragnet.
And, as Professors Akram and Johnson contend, the government
has gone beyond airport profiling to arrest and detain many Muslims
18. United States v. Korematsu. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Justice Black. writing for the Court.
noted that Korematsu had been convicted of remaining in a "Military Area" in violation of
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34. which provided that all persons of Japanese ancestry must be
excluded from that area. Id. at 215-16. He stressed that laws curtailing the civil rights of a single
social group were immediately suspect and would be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny. Id. at
216. He asserted, however, that public necessity could sometimes justify such laws. Id. Justice
Black claimed that the defendant was excluded from the Military Area. not because of his race,
but because the United States was at war with Japan. and because military authorities, fearing an
invasion of the West Coast, felt compelled to take proper security measures. Id. at 223. He
further stated that Korematsu was excluded because the military determined that the urgency of
the situation required that all people of Japanese descent be segregated temporarily from the
West Coast. "and finally, because Congress. reposing its confidence in this time of war in our
military leaders - as inevitably it must - determined that they should have the power to do just
this." Id.
19. 1 thank Professor Frank Wu for his many thoughtful contributions to the YLOPEARL
listserve that led to my comparing General DeWitt's rhetoric with both the post-September II
debate on racial profiling and Justice Story's commentary on the Presidential Eligibility Clause.
20. Korenatsi. 323 U.S. at 236 n.2 (Murphy. J.. dissenting).
2003]
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in a sweep reminiscent of the Japanese internment. 21 Akram and
Johnson report that in the weeks following the attack on the World
Trade Center, the U.S. government arrested and detained roughly one
thousand noncitizens, with Pakistanis and Egyptians most greatly rep-
resented.22 This dragnet, however, apparently did not reveal any di-
rect links to the terrorist acts.2 3 Undeterred, the Justice Department
sought interviews with an additional five thousand men, most of
whom were Arab or Muslim between the ages of eighteen and thirty-
three, who had come to the United States on non-immigrant visas
since January 1, 2000.24 Akram and Johnson maintain that no evi-
dence existed that any of those men were involved in terrorist activi-
ties.2 5 They conclude, therefore, that "the legal measures taken by the
federal government reinforce deeply-held negative stereotypes-for-
eignness and possibly disloyalty-about Arabs and Muslims. 2 6
The psychological costs of race and citizenship-based suspicion
should not be underestimated. Social psychologists and critical-race
theorists have long documented the damage done by prejudice admin-
21. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 13, at 331. Akram and Johnson argue that there are
important similarities between the mass arrest, detention, and interviews of Muslims after Sep-
tember 11 and the Japanese internment. Id. at 337. They maintain that it was not individualized
suspicion, but statistical probabilities that resulted in action aimed at a "discrete and insular
minority." Id.: see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.. 304 U.S. 144. 152 n.4 (1938) (holding
that because of deficiencies in the political process, classifications that affect a discrete and insu-
lar minority might require that a heightened level of scrutiny be applied). The authors assert
that "foreign" appearance, along with ideas of "foreignness." play a part in how we define na-
tional identity and loyalty. Akram & Johnson, supra note 13, at 337. They contend that the
treatment of Muslims after September 11 is, in some ways. more extralegal than the internment
of Japanese-Americans. Id. Akram and Johnson reason that "[no] executive order authorizes
the treatment of Arabs and Muslims: nor has there been a formal declaration of war." Id.
22. Id. at 331.
23. Id.
24. Id. They argue that, although the interviews were technically "voluntary," without doubt,
many people felt that they were compulsory. Akram & Johnson. supra note 13. at 334.
25. ld. In addition to the Muslim dragnet. Akram and Johnson discuss other actions taken by
the United States government in response to September 11. They note that Congress quickly
passed the USA PATRIOT Act giving the federal government the power to detain noncitizens.
thought to be terrorists, for up to a week without charges. Id. at 347-48. The authors point out
that this act also strengthened the federal government's surveillance powers of both citizens and
immigrants who were believed to be associated with terrorism. Id. at 348.
26. Id. at 341. Their article also raises several other important objections to Arab and Muslim
profiling. Id. at 339-41. Akram and Johnson argue that Fourth Amendment notions, ordinarily
requiring equality and individualized suspicion before a person can be stopped, are infringed by
a mass dragnet aimed at all Muslims because it is over-inclusive. Moreover, they write that the
Muslim dragnet could prove to be a poor law enforcement technique because racial profiling
alienates minority communities, therefore making it more difficult for law enforcement agencies
to obtain their cooperation. Finally. Akram and Johnson assert that for Arab immigrants and
Arab-Americans. the dragnet suggests that they are not full members of society. Id. at 336-41.
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istered in small doses-microaggressions, as they are called.2 7 Just as
the exclusion of those of Japanese ancestry signaled their outsider sta-
tus in a physical way, the targeting of Muslim and Arab immigrants
post-September 11 sends the same message, albeit in psychological
form. As lawyers and law students, we know from our first-year torts
course that emotional distress may be just as harmful as physical in-
jury.28 Indeed, as many critical scholars have demonstrated, 29 stereo-
27. These are subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are "put
downs" of blacks by offenders. Psychiatrists who have studied black populations view
them as "incessant and cumulative" assaults on black self-esteem. Microaggressions
simultaneously sustain[ ] defensive-deferential thinking and erode[ ] self confidence in
Blacks . . . . [B]y monopolizing . . . perception and action through regularly irregular
disruptions, they contribute[ I to relative paralysis of action, planning and self-esteem.
They seem to be the principal foundation for the verification of Black inferiority for
both whites and Blacks. The management of these assaults is a preoccupying activity,
simultaneously necessary to and disruptive of black adaptation. [The black person's]
self-esteem suffers . . . because he is constantly receiving an unpleasant image of him-
self from the behavior of others to him. This is the subjective impact of social discrimi-
nation .... It seems to be an ever-present and unrelieved irritant. Its influence is not
alone due to the fact that it is painful in its intensity, but also because the individual, in
order to maintain internal balance and to protect himself from being overwhelmed by
it, must initiate restitutive maneuvers . . .- all quite automatic and unconscious. In
addition to maintaining an internal balance, the individual must continue to maintain a
social facade and some kind of adaptation to the offending stimuli so that he can pre-
serve some social effectiveness. All of this requires a constant preoccupation, notwith-
standing . . . that these adaptational processes . . . take place on a low order of
awareness. Vigilance and psychic energy are required not only to marshall adaptational
techniques, but also to distinguish microaggressions from differently motivated actions
and to determine "which of many daily microaggressions one must undercut."
Peggy Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 1565-66 (1989) (internal citations
omitted).
28. DAN B. Donns, THE LAW OF TORTS 821 (2000) ("Courts have long recognized that
tortfeasors should be responsible for causing distress, emotional harm, anxiety, diminished en-
joyment, losses of autonomy, and similar intangible harms .... All such [distress or emotional]
harms are real. They represent the antithesis of happiness or enjoyment of life which everyone
pursues.").
29. See. e.g., Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome." in ASIAN
AMERI(CANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOcUMENTARY HISIORY 10)87, 1098 (Hyung-Chan
Kim ed., 1982)
The evacuated Japanese Americans, including U.S. citizens, were presumed to be suffi-
ciently foreign for an inference by the military that such racial-foreigners might be dis-
loyal. Japanese Americans were therefore characterized as different from the African
American racial minority. With the presence of racial foreignness. a presumption of
disloyalty was reasonable and natural.
Neil Gotanda. "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1186, 1190-92 (1985) (discussing Korematsu and other wartime "camp cases"):
Keith Aoki, "Foreign-ness" & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War I] Propaganda.
and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (1996): Natsu Taylor Saito.
Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness," and Racial Hierarchy in American Law,
76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997): FRANK Wu, YELLOw 79-129 (2002): Kevin R. Johnson. Public Bene-
fits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. 42
UCLA L. REV. 1509. 1545-46 (1995) ("The stereotypical 'illegal alien,' the term that replaced
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types of foreignness seem to follow racial patterns: Latinas and Asians
are perpetually foreign; European and African Americans are not.
These narratives help explain General Dewitt's otherwise seemingly
anachronistic assessment: "The danger of the Japanese was, and is
now.., espionage and sabotage. It makes no difference whether he is
an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does
not necessarily determine loyalty. '30
B. Why Racial and Citizenship Proxies Are Irrational
But what of the claim that there is a rationality to racial and citizen-
ship profiling? 31 That is, doesn't it make sense to stop all Muslim and
Arab immigrants because after all, all the September 11 terrorists
were Muslim and Arab? There are at least four responses to this
point: First, as Professor David Harris documents in great detail in his
recent book, Profiles in Injustice,32 federal and state officials who have
studied racial profiling conclude that it does not lead to better law
enforcement. For example, a General Accounting Office report of
U.S. Customs Service procedures in 1997 and 1998 revealed that cus-
toms officers were less effective when they relied on race and gender
profiles in conducting searches for contraband than when they did not,
prompting Customs to require better oversight of officer actions.33
Second, even assuming that racial profiling is marginally effective,
shouldn't we expand our profiles to target non-Arab terrorist types as
'wetback,' is a Mexican who has sneaked into the United States in the dark of night. The image
in the minds of many is that of a poor. brown, unskilled young male.
30. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 236 n.2 (Murphy, J.. dissenting).
31. John Derbyshire, A (Potentially) Useful Tool, 12 THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY. Winter
2001-02, at 67. 69-70 (arguing that racial profiling should be used along with other criteria within
context of airport security); DINESH D'SOuZA, THE END OF RACISM 259 (1995) (describing ra-
cial profiling as "rational racism"); Stephen J. Singer, Racial Profiling Also Has a Good Side.
NEWSDAY, Sept. 25, 2001. at A38 (arguing that race, along with other factors, can indicate that
further investigation is needed). Editorial. Profiling Debate Resumes, DENVER Posi. Oct. 3.
2001. at B6 (asserting that race should be considered in finding law enforcement targets).
32. DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK
(2002). See also DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999): RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE. CRIME AND THE LAW (1997); Kevin R.
Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. LQ. 675
(2000); Angela J. Davis. Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 425 (1997): Jennifer
A. Larrabee, "DWB (Driving While Black)" and Equal Protection: The Realities of an Unconsti-
tutional Police Practice, 87 J.L. & POL'Y 291 (1997): Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998): Anthony Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and
the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999): Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving While
Black": Corollary Phenomena and Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717 (1999).
33. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE. BETTER TARGETING OF AIR-
LINE PASSENGERS FOR PERSONAL SEARCHES COULD PRODUCE BETTER RESULTS. REPORT TO
THE HON. RICHARD J. DuRBIN, U.S. SENATE (Mar. 2000); HARRIS, supra note 32, at 215-22.
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well? We know, for instance, that the Abu Sayyaf group in the south-
ern Philippines has links to Al-Qaeda, hence America's military in-
volvement in that country's affairs. 34  Should we begin profiling
Filipino and Filipino-looking individuals at airports-which would in-
clude yours truly? After all, our terrorist profiles should be inclusive,
not exclusive. (Ironically, focusing excessively on a "foreign terrorist"
profile might be exactly what Al-Qaeda wants: Osama bin Laden aide
Abu Zubaydah has apparently instructed terror recruits to "shave
their beards, adopt Western clothing and 'do whatever it takes to
avoid detection and see their missions through.' 35 Indeed, one of the
few proven terrorists to date is John Walker Lindh, a European
American-not an Arab, and not a noncitizen.) 36
Third, given the importance of profiling in the war against terror-
ism, shouldn't we advocate profiles in other law enforcement contexts,
which would require us to strictly scrutinize white, rural schoolchil-
dren in the school shooting (a.k.a. "Columbine") context; rich, white
males for white-collar crimes such as embezzling and corporate fraud
(think: "Enron"); and disenfranchised white male spies like Aldrich
34. See, e.g., Johanna McGeary, Next Stop Mindanao. TIME. Jan. 28. 2002, at 36: Johanna
McGeary, Can Al-Qaeda Find a New Nest?, TIME. Dec. 24.2001, at 50.54-55 (suggesting that Al-
Qaeda has connections in Somalia, Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan, and the Philippines): Richard C.
Paddock, U.S. to Help Philippines Battle Terrorist Threat Asia. L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001. at Al.
available at 2001 WL 28937220 ("Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo visited Presi-
dent Bush last month in Washington and received a commitment of $100 million worth of mili-
tary equipment to fight the [Abu Sayyaf] rebels.") Adam Brown, More U.S. Troops Fly in to
Train Filipinos, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25. 2002. at 4, available at 2002 WL 2616151 ("The first U.S.
soldiers to arrive with assault rifles strapped to their backs flew into the southern Philippines on
Thursday to help prepare for a joint military exercise aimed at fighting [the Abu Sayyaf.] a
Muslim extremist group."). Apparently. the joint Philippine-U.S. military offensive against the
Abu Sayyaf has paid dividends, leading to a substantial decrease in the group's strength. See
Phillip P. Pan, Abu Sayyaf Unit, Maybe 10 in All, Is Hard-Pressed. INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 12.
2002, at 5 ("[Former U.S. hostage Gracia] Burnham reported that only 14 Abu Sayyaf fighters
were in the group holding her and the others, down from more than 100 a year ago ....").
The racial and ethnic dimensions of profiling have led to difficult and complex problems both
in the United States and abroad. At the U.S.-Mexico border, more stringent immigration con-
trols have led some Mexicans to blame Arabs for their predicament. Peter Katel, Slamming the
Door. TIME. Mar. 11, 2002. at 37 (quoting Mexican deportee Jose Guzman: "Damn Arabs ....
Ever since the towers, it's 'Out of here.'"). And in the Philippines, anti-Abu Sayyaf prejudice
takes on a religious and ethnic dimension, rather than having a racial component so much a part
of the problem in the United States. See, e.g., Fatemah Remedios C. Balbin. Police Prejudice
Against Muslims. PHILA. DAILY INQUIRER. June 6, 2002, at A8 (letter to the editor) (on file with
the author) (describing errant terrorist profiling conducted by the Philippine National police.
leading to harassment and arrest of many Muslims).
35. Massimo Calabresi & Romesh Ratnesar. Can We Stop the Next Attack?. TIME, Mar. 11,
2002, at 27.
36. See. e.g., John Riley. Lindh Admits Guilt. NEWKSDAY. July 16. 2002, at A3. available at 2002
WL 2753747: Michael Hedges. Lindh Faces Court. Hous. CHRON.. Jan. 25. 2002. at 1. available at
2002 WL 3237490.
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Ames in the counterespionage game? 37 To the extent that disloyalty
encompasses a general disrespect for our criminal laws, racial profiling
of whites should occur if the statistics suggest links between ethnicity
and specific crimes.
Fourth and finally, the next successful terrorist will likely thwart any
profile we create. While I have no problem using specific, accurate
information-including race and citizenship-to find a suspect ac-
cused of a crime 38 such as was done to eventually apprehend the
Unabomber, as a practical matter, profiles will not capture the next
successful terrorist because he or she will thwart the profile. 39 Indeed,
37. See, e.g., Tim Wise, We Show Our True Colors in Wake of Tragedy. ST. Louis POST-Dis-
PATCH, Mar. 13, 2001. available at http://www.commondreams.org/viewsOllO313-02.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 12. 2003) ("[T]he FBI insists there is no 'profile' of a school shooter. Come again?
White boy after white boy uses classmates for target practice, and yet there is no profile? Imag-
ine if all these killers had been black: Would we hesitate to put a racial label on the perpetra-
tors? Doubtful."): Donald S. Bustany. Why Is It Still OK to Defame Arabs?, NEWSDAY. MAY 9,
1995. at A35, available at 1995 WL 5109613:
But, if prejudging-good old fashioned prejudice-hasn't stopped for black Americans
and Latinos, why should it stop for Arabs? It has stopped for Jews and never started
for Christians. When Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken did their dirty financial deeds,
the Jewish community didn't get nasty looks or rocks through their windows from the
rest of us. When Christian minister Paul Hill fatally shot abortion doctor John Britton
in Pensacola, we didn't burn Islamic crescents or Stars of David on the lawns of Chris-
tians. While a lot of minority groups still suffer from bigotry, the only group that some
political observers still dare defame in public are the Arabs.
Id.
38. Even within this context, using race as a factor should not lead to an overreliance on that
one trait. In Brown v. City of Oneonta. the Second Circuit upheld the questioning of over two
hundred persons of color based on victim testimony that the fugitive was African-American. See
Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 44 (2001). Con-
trary to the Brown case. I believe courts should more strictly scrutinize police tactics to discern
whether too much emphasis was placed on race or any other single characteristic. Accord Kevin
R. Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement: Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of Law, VILL. L. REv. 897.
903 (2002) ("[E]ven though race may be a logical factor to consider under [certain] circum-
stances, police may rely excessively on race in criminal investigation and emphasize it over all
else.") (emphasis in original).
39. As Professor Harris notes, despite current law enforcement's best efforts to eliminate ra-
cial and ethnic profiling from its training, the average police officer still receives much informa-
tion on criminal types, including drug couriers, which have an ethnic or racial component: "In
1999, a DEA intelligence report identified those it suspected of involvement in the heroin trade.
'Predominant wholesale traffickers are Colombian, followed by Dominicans. Chinese. West Af-
rican/Nigerian. Pakistani, Hispanic, and Indian.'" HARRIS, supra note 32. at 49.
The Supreme Court has upheld the use of race as a factor in the border patrol stops against a
Fourth Amendment challenge. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). The
Court has not addressed, however, whether racially-motivated police enforcement violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
813 (1986):
We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforce-
ment of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection
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the next terrorist might not even know she is one. In 1986, Israeli
officials found a bomb hidden in the luggage of an Irish woman who
reported that her significant other was Jordanian. 40
III. PROXIES FOR LOYALTY: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELIGIBILITY
CLAUSE AND THE IMMIGRANT FOUNDER EXCEPTION
Now that we have explored one extreme on the "(dis)loyalty" spec-
trum, let's examine the other: what it means to be "loyal." The issue
here is the opposite of the terrorism question. If we believe that the
paradigm example of loyalty should be the President, the question be-
comes, "What qualities must a President possess to demonstrate loy-
alty to her nation?" The Founders contemplated this exact question
by passing the following resolution on July 26, 1787:
Resolved That it be an instruction to the Committee to whom were
referred the proceedings of the Convention for the establishment of
a national government, to receive a clause or clauses, requiring cer-
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.
Id. Outside the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has distinguished between illegitimate
status-based laws and law enforcement techniques-of which racial and citizenship profiling are
a type-and legal conduct-based measures. Compare Robinson v. California. 370 U.S. 660. 666
(1962) ("[W]e deal with a statute which makes the 'status' of narcotic addiction a criminal of-
fense .... "). with Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (holding case outside scope of Robinson
because defendant was convicted not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while
intoxicated): Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (noting that "proscriptions against
[homosexual] conduct have ancient roots"), with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620. 623-24 (1996)
(-[Amendment 2] is a status-based enactment [based on sexual orientation] divorced from any
factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests.").
40. See Associated Press. Prosecutor Ties Syria to El Al Bomb Attempt. L.A. TiMES. Oct. 6.
t986, at 2, available at 1986 WL 2151283:
Prosecutor Roy Amlot said Nezar Hindawi. a Jordanian accused of planting a bomb in
the suitcase of his pregnant Irish girlfriend, told police he had met the head of Syrian
military intelligence in Damascus and had agreed to carry out attacks on Israeli targets
for money and preferential treatment at Syrian universities.
Id. See also Lisa Bever, Israel's El Al Airline: Is This What We Really Want?, TiMF, Sept. 24.
2001. at 91 (noting that the bomb was discovered as a result of El Al Airline's practice of em-
ploying teams of agents to interrogate passengers for anywhere from twenty minutes to two
hours in order to discover any inconsistencies in terrorists' made-up stories or to discover people
who may be unwitting accomplices). At a June 5. 2002 press conference. Attorney General
Ashcroft announced heightened immigration requirements for nationals of certain countries.
Fingerprinting, photographing. and registration requirements have been imposed on all visitors
from Iran. Iraq, Libya. Sudan. and Syria among others. See Attorney Gen. Announces Reg. Re-
quiring Registration, Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants. 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 899
(2002). As the Israeli experience with the unsuspecting girlfriend "terrorist- suggests. perhaps
this requirement should be imposed upon all nonimmigrants, if not all persons within the United
States, as the case of John Walker Lindh bears out. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
Of course, such a requirement would be extremely costly to implement. but such an inconve-
nience might be worthwhile if it leads to enhanced intelligence without compromising civil
liberties.
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tain qualifications of landed property and citizenship in the United
States for the Executive, the Judiciary, and the Members of both
branches of the Legislature of the United States[. 4 1
Just as we have no technology for divining the next terrorist, nor do
we have a device for helping us select the most loyal person for Presi-
dent. As in our terrorism calculus, we rely on proxies for loyalty. In
the context of the Presidency, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5 of our
Constitution 42 requires that the President be a natural born citizen or
a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution.4 3 So, while naturalized citizens were originally eligible for
this highest executive office, this provision was intended to specifically
reward those Founders who were immigrants. Indeed, in its initial
draft, the conventioneers drew no distinction between "natural born"
and "naturalized," using the single term "citizen.' ' 44 That they
changed the text to differentiate between the two suggests that natural
born citizens were more presumptively loyal than naturalized ones.
This interpretation is supported by Joseph Story in his famous com-
mentaries on the Constitution. Story noted in 1833 that this "immi-
grant Founder" exception was:
doubtless introduced (for it has now become by lapse of time
merely nominal, and will soon become wholly extinct) out of respect
to those distinguished revolutionary patriots, who were born in a
foreign land, and yet had entitled themselves to high honours in
their adopted country. A positive exclusion would have been unjust
to their merits, and painful to their sensibilities. But the general
propriety of the exclusion of foreigners, in common cases, will
scarcely be doubted by any statesman. It cuts off all chances for
ambitious foreigners, who might otherwise be intriguing for office:
and interposes a barrier against those corrupt interferences of for-
41. MAX FARRAND, 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. 563 (Rev. ed.
1937).
42. The Clause provides:
No Person except a natural born Citizen. or a Citizen of the United States. at the time
of the Adoption of this Constitution. shall be eligible to the Office of President: neither
shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I1. § 1. cl. 5.
43. The misplaced commas in the clause have led some to argue (perhaps cynically) that the
qualified "at the time of the adoption of this constitution" applies to both natural born and
naturalized citizens, leading to the conclusion that Zachary Taylor was the last legitimate presi-
dent of the United States. See Jordan Steiker et al.. Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously:
Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REv. 237 (1995).
44. FARRAND, supra note 41, at 563. The conventioneers' initial draft provided that "he shall
be of the age of thirty five years, and a Citizen of the United States. and shall have been an
Inhabitant thereof for Twenty one years." Id.
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eign governments in executive elections, which have inflicted the
most serious evils upon the elective monarchies of Europe.45
Specifically, Story referred to the nations of Germany and Poland as
examples of executive governments unduly influenced by foreign
forces.
Story's rhetoric shares a striking similarity to General DeWitt's:
Both describe the need to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal-
DeWitt suggested that the Japanese be "wiped off the map;"' 46 Story
advocated the establishment of a "barrier" against foreign influence. 47
Both acknowledged the permanency of foreignness-DeWitt argued
that a Japanese person was always disloyal even if a naturalized citi-
zen;48 Story draws no clear distinction between naturalized citizen and
foreigner, stating only that he believes that the immigrant Founders
had earned the designation "loyal," rendering them fit to be Presi-
dent, in what Story believed to be a narrow exception to the general
rule. 4 9
But perhaps the most telling feature of Story's commentary is his
remark that to not exempt the immigrant Founders would have been
"unjust to their merits, and painful to their sensibilities. ' 51 Put an-
other way, the immigrant Founders had demonstrated that, even
though they were presumptively disloyal and foreign, they were actu-
ally good Americans worthy of being President. Contrast this obser-
vation with Kinsley's earlier evaluation that the harm visited upon
innocent victims of post-September 11 airport racial profiling was
"pretty small: inconvenience and embarrassment, as opposed to losing
a job or getting lynched. '' 51 It seems to me that one could easily imag-
ine switching Story's and Kinsley's rationales to argue for not exempt-
ing naturalized citizens at the time of the Founding, on the one hand,
and to argue against racial profiling, on the other. Paraphrasing Story,
post-September 11 racial profiling is "unjust to [the] merits" of Mus-
lim and Arab peoples and "painful to their sensibilities." 52 Citing
Kinsley, excluding the immigrant Founders from the Presidency visits
45. JOSEPH STORY. 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1473 (1833). Story also ob-
served that the exception created for the immigrant Founders was a departure from the policy
exercised by all governments of excluding foreign influence from executive councils and duties.
Id.
46. Korematsu. 323 U.S. at 236 n.2 (Murphy. J.. dissenting).
47. STORY. supra note 45. § 1473.
48. Korematsn. 323 U.S. at 236 n.2 (Murphy. J.. dissenting).
49. STORY. supra note 45. § 1473.
50. Id.
51. Kinslev. Discrimination. supra note 16. at 66.
52. SiORY. supra note 45. § 1473.
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a harm that is "pretty small: inconvenience and embarrassment, as op-
posed to losing a job or getting lynched. '53
Yet most people's reactions are similar to Story's and Kinsley's,
rather than the other way around. Even though most agree that race
and citizenship are, at best, imperfect proxies for loyalty, many are
willing to tolerate post-September 11 terrorist profiling on the basis of
race, while not too many get excited about amending the Constitution
to rid it of the birthright/naturalized citizen distinction in the Presi-
dential Eligibility Clause. Whenever I have discussed the natural born
citizenship requirement, whether in Constitutional Law, Immigration
Law, or Racism and Law courses, there is universal agreement that
the clause makes no sense in this modern age. In a well-known law
review symposium on the stupidest provisions of the Constitution, two
leading scholars-Randall Kennedy and Robert Post-independently
selected the natural born citizenship clause as the worst. 54 Aside from
the clause's inability to accurately measure loyalty, it disproportion-
ately precludes persons of color from the Presidency, since most natu-
ralized citizens today are from Asia and Latin America.55 Indeed, the
53. Kinsley. Discrimination. supra note 16. at 66.
54. See Randall Kennedy, A Natural Aristocracy?. 12 CONST. COMMENT. 175. 176 (1995)
("This idolatry of mere place of birth seems to me an instance of rank superstition. Place of
birth indicates nothing about a person's willed attachment to a country. a polity, a way of life."):
Robert Post. What is the Constitution's Worst Provision?, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 191. 193 (1995)
(-Because allegiance is a matter of voluntary commitment rather than birth, it should not sys-
tematically differ as between naturalized and natural born citizens.").
Post-September 11. the United States is not alone in its distrust of foreigners. Amnesty Inter-
national reports that the following countries and groups of nations have engaged in a
"clampdown on foreigners: denial of right to asylum, harsher treatment of asylum seekers, or
mass deportations:" the European Union, the Arab League. Canada, Germany, Denmark,
United Kingdom. Kazakstan. Kyrgyzstan, Hungary, Greece, Yemen, Mauritius, South Korea.
and Australia. See Amnesty International USA, Responses to Terrorism. AMNESTY Now. Sum-
mer 2002. at 16-17 (map depicting various nations' responses to terrorism).
55. Thanks to Kevin Johnson for this idea. E-mail from Kevin R. Johnson. Professor of Law
and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, U.C. Davis School of Law, to Victor C. Romero.
Professor of Law. The Pennsylvania State University (Mar. 11. 2002) (on file with author) [here-
inafter Johnson E-mail].
Large Asian and Latin American migration has not always been the norm. The late 1840s saw
the first major immigration to the United States since independence. It drew a little more than
five million people, mostly Europeans. from the United Kingdom, Ireland. Germany. and Scan-
dinavia before it peaked in the 1880s. The next wave peaked in the first decade of the 1900s.
More than nine million Italians. Poles, and eastern European Jews immigrated to the United
States. The Great Depression and World War 11 virtually cut off immigration to this country.
However, after the end of World War II. immigration to the United States began again and has
since steadily increased. See Jeffrey S. Passel & Michael Fix. U.S. Immigration in a Global Con-
text: Past, Present and Future. 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5 (1994). Passel and Fix assert that
"[i]mmigration has profoundly affected the character of the United States at several key points
in the nation's history, notably the colonial period. mid-nineteenth century. early twentieth cen-
turv. and the last twenty-five years." Id. at 7.
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clause's effect on naturalized citizens of color is not unlike how the
disenfranchisement of felons disparately impacts the African-Ameri-
can community.5 6 Yet, when I ask my students whether they think a
constitutional amendment to get rid of the birthright/naturalized citi-
zenship distinction 57 would pass, they uniformly express pessimism
about such a project.
I am troubled by what such indifference suggests about America's
priorities when we are quick to racially profile post-September 11 de-
spite its inaccuracy, and yet are unwilling to eliminate the birthright
citizenship distinction in the Presidential Eligibility Clause despite its
inanity. In a sense, I am speaking out of self-interest as one of many
naturalized citizens of color who would theoretically fit the negative
stereotypes in both the terrorism and Presidential eligibility contexts:
Being Filipino by national origin, I fit the Abu Sayyaf terrorist racial
profile, and being a naturalized citizen (but not an immigrant
Founder) I am presumptively disloyal and therefore ineligible for the
Presidency. But I do not think of myself as anything but a loyal
American. While my parents and siblings still live in the Philippines, I
thought long and hard about where my loyalties lay when I took my
U.S. citizenship oath in 1995. I took seriously the charge that I disa-
vow allegiance to any foreign potentate. In the unlikely event that the
Abu Sayyaf take over the Philippines and the United States declares
war, I am ready to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces, if conscripted
Most of the immigrants that make up this current wave are from Latin American and Asia.
According to the 1999 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Mex-
ico was the leading country of origin for legal immigrants in 1999. with 147,573. The other chief
countries of origin for legal immigrants included the People's Republic of China (32,204), the
Philippines (31,026), India (30,237), and Vietnam (20,393). The leading country of birth of peo-
ple naturalizing in 1999 was Mexico, at 207,750. The other major countries of birth for persons
naturalizing included Vietnam (53,316). the Philippines (38,944), the People's Republic of China
(38,409), India (30,710), Jamaica (28.604), Cuba (25,467). the Dominican Republic (23.089), El
Salvador (22.991). and Haiti (19,550). 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRAiTION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1999), available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statis-
tics/FY99Yearbook.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
56. Thanks again to Kevin Johnson for this idea. See Johnson E-mail, supra note 55. Profes-
sor John Calmore notes that there are 1.5 million disenfranchised African Americans: Maine.
Massachusetts. and Vermont are the only states that do not disenfranchise offenders while they
are in prison. Thirty-two states deny parolees the right to vote, and twenty-nine states disen-
franchise probationers. In nine states, felons are precluded from voting for the rest of their lives.
See John 0. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography in a Multiracing
America, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1253, 1274 (2001). Calmore argues that the disproportionate impact
felon disenfranchisement has on African Americans is a consequence of the United States's mass
incarceration. He asserts that, in addition to denying felons the right to vote, disenfranchisement
"constitutes vote dilution to the black community." Id. at 1256.
57. As a practical matter, the only limitation to this would be the "dual citizen." because if the
United States should be at war with the country with whom the President also enjoys citizenship
status, there would obviously be a conflict of interest.
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(which, by the way, naturalized citizens and immigrants are subject to
under federal law). 58 Yet, somehow, these reassurances do not rebut
the presumption of my disloyalty to qualify me for the Presidency.
Although, fortunately for my wife and kids, I do not aspire to be
either a terrorist or U.S. President, the question remains: Why are
most Americans willing to tolerate race and citizenship profiling in the
contexts of battling terrorism and determining Presidential eligibility,
despite an acknowledgment by most that both are far from perfect
proxies for loyalty?
Not surprisingly, critical-race theorists and social psychologists
teach us that we tend to think of those who are different-that is,
racial and noncitizen outsiders-as disloyal. Hence, those who are
nonwhite and noncitizens are presumptively suspect. Conversely, we
believe that those who are similar to us are more loyal and hence, less
suspect. As psychologist Gordon Allport explained in his path-break-
ing work, The Nature of Prejudice, every individual draws distinctions
between in-groups and out-groups for survival:
[In-group] memberships constitute a web of habits. When we en-
counter an outsider who follows different customs we unconsciously
say, "He breaks my habits." Habit-breaking is unpleasant. We pre-
fer the familiar. We cannot help but feel a bit on guard when other
people seem to threaten or even question habits. 59
Allport contends, however, that in-groups can be cohesive without be-
ing antagonistic toward out-groups: "Narrow circles can, without con-
flict, be supplemented by larger circles of loyalty. '60 Hence, the
Presidency of the United States should be open to both birthright and
naturalized citizens (a larger circle of citizenship), even though immi-
58. See 50 U.S.C. § 453 (1994). One of my symposium co-participants. Esther Lopez of the
AFL-CIO, pointed out the irony of post-September 11 security policy: While new government
regulations require that airport baggage screeners must be U.S. citizens, the soldiers assigned to
safeguard the airports-and assigned firearms to accomplish the task-need not be. Esther Lo-
pez. AFL-CIO. Comments During the Symposium at the DePaul Law Review (Mar. 9. 2002).
Interestingly, while the Constitution requires that the President be a natural born citizen, the
Supreme Court has found the denationalization of a wartime deserter to be an unconstitutional
sanction under the Eighth Amendment. See Trop v. Dulles. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The defendant
in Trop was a soldier whose citizenship was taken away after he was convicted by court martial
of wartime desertion. Id. at 87. When Trop was unable to obtain a passport because he was not
a citizen of the United States. he sued seeking a judgment restoring his citizenship. Id. at 88.
Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black. Douglas, and Whittaker. declared that denation-
alization violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at
101. Chief Justice Warren did not argue that taking away a person's citizenship was excessive in
relation to the crime of wartime desertion because wartime desertion was also punishable by
death. Id, at 99. Rather, he asserted that denationalization subjected a person to a fate that the
Eighth Amendment did not permit. Id.




gration and nationality law distinguishes between U.S. citizens and
noncitizens (a narrower circle). Similarly, airport security burdens
should be visited upon all airline passengers (a larger circle of trav-
elers) rather than only upon Muslims and Arabs (a smaller racial and
religious circle).
But how do we convince the fifty-seven percent of Americans 6' who
were in favor of profiling in the fall of 2001 and the many more who
are disinclined to eliminate the Presidential Eligibility Clause's birth-
right/naturalized citizen distinction that drawing large circles of loy-
alty makes sense? The answer is that these citizenship and race
distinctions are irrational proxies for loyalty. I contend that, even
within the contexts of the "disloyal terrorist" and the "loyal Presi-
dent," relying on race and citizenship as proxies for loyalty are so in-
accurate that they are unnecessarily antagonistic to those in the racial
and citizenship out-group. My suspicion is that those who fancy them-
selves loyal believe that there is a group of readily identifiable "dis-
loyalists" whose racial and citizenship characteristics are different
from theirs. Hence, the Arab or Muslim naturalized citizen is more
likely a terrorist and least likely qualified to be President of the
United States than the average white, Anglo-Saxon birthright citizen.
The reality, of course, is that terrorists and Presidents come in all citi-
zenships and colors (remember President Alberto Fujimori, a Peru-
vian of Japanese descent?) and, indeed the danger of assuming that
the terrorist is someone who belongs to one group overlooks the pos-
sibility that the terrorist could come from the so-called non-terrorist
group. Two examples are worth noting. After the Oklahoma City
bombing, many terrorist experts immediately suspected Arab ter-
rorists to be at fault, only to discover that the crime was perpetrated
by two white men with links to racist hate groups. 62 Following Sep-
tember 11, deaths by anthrax led many to wonder whether al-Qaeda
61. I am encouraged by a report I saw on ABC News on the Friday night before the sympo-
sium. March 8. 2002, stating that only 45% of those surveyed believed that it was appropriate to
question persons solely because they are Muslim or Arab. The good news is that this is substan-
tially less than the 57% from the fall: the bad news is that it is still close to 50% of those polled.
62. See, e.g., Wiley A. Hall, Arab-Americans Assail Rush to Judgment. BALl. EVENING SUN.
Apr. 25. 1995. at A2, available at 1995 WL 2437929:
In hindsight, of course, our first suspicions should not have fallen on Arab-Americans
but on angry young white men-that group whose sense of rage was so recently cele-
brated in the media after the Republican triumph in the November elections. The
membership of such groups as the Ku Klux Klan. the skinheads, neo-Nazis, militias, and
other white supremacist and anti-government organizations is said to be growing. Acts
of violence associated with those groups increased in 1994.
Id. See also Michael Grunwald. Muslims Fear Being Made Scapegoats. BoSTON GLOBE. Apr. 21,
1995. at 1, available at 1995 WL 5935143 ("Even after officials denied reports that Middle East-
ern suspects were under arrest and announced they were seeking two white males, Arab-Ameri-
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had struck again; some believe that the killers are probably domestic,
right wing extremists. 63 The lesson here is that the enemy-especially
the terrorist enemy-can very easily be a member of the in-group cap-
italizing on public scrutiny of out-group behavior.
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME LESSONS FROM LITERATURE
Although admittedly nonscientific, I find Robert Louis Stevenson's
novel, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, instructive on this point. In the book,
the revered Dr. Jekyll recognized that each person has within him two
personalities, one good and one evil. In the end, the evil persona, Mr.
Hyde, triumphs because Dr. Jekyll underestimates his alter ego's
power, believing he can control Hyde by only unmasking him when it
suited Jekyll's purposes. Ironically, Jekyll's belated realization that he
had no control over his evil self occurred at a time when he was con-
templating his own goodness:
After all, I reflected, I was like my neighbours; and then I smiled,
comparing myself with other men, comparing my active goodwill
with the lazy cruelty of their neglect. And at the very moment of
that vainglorious thought, a qualm came over me, a horrid nausea
and the most deadly shuddering. These passed away, and left me
faint; and then as in its turn the faintness subsided, I began to be
cans and Muslims said they feared they were becoming convenient scapegoats for outrage about
international terrorism.").
After September 11, the backlash against the Arab and Muslim community was staggering.
See, e.g., David Van Biema, As American As .... TIME, Oct. 1. 2001, at 72-73 ('All told, the
Council on American-Islamic Relations counts more than 600 'incidents' since Sept. 11 victimiz-
ing people thought to be Arab or Muslim, including four murders, 45 people assaulted and 60
mosques attacked."). In response, the Justice Department stated that it has investigated some
350 reported crimes against people of Middle Eastern or South Asian origin since the terrorist
attacks last fall. See Associated Press, On Lookout for Retaliation, NEWSDAY, June 26, 2002. at
A17, available at 2002 WL 2750758.
In an interesting twist post-Oklahoma City, the Southern Poverty Law Center has recently
discovered links between Muslim terrorists and domestic neo-Nazi extremists based on their
similar distaste for the U.S. government. For example, the Philadelphia-based American Front
lauds Osama bin Laden as "one of ZOG [Zionist Occupation Government, the name many
extremists give to the federal government, which they believe is run by Jews] and the New World
Order's biggest enemies." Martin A. Lee, Southern Poverty Law Center, The Swastika and the
Crescent, INTELLIGENCE REP., Spring 2002, at 18, 24.
63. See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick, Lessons Learned, TIME. Dec. 31, 2001-Jan. 7. 2002, at 126,
128: see also Editorial, No Anthrax Answers This Year, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2001, at A16 (as-
serting that the anthrax appears to be of domestic origin); Marsha Kranes, Anthrax Probe Shifts
to Homegrown Hate Groups, N.Y. POST, Oct. 25, 2001. at 4, available at 2001 WL 28045672
("The FBI has feared an anthrax attack by domestic terrorists for years, with its concerns regu-
larly fueled by hoaxes and false alarms."). But see Peter Slevin, In Anthrax Probe, Questions of
Skill, Motive, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2001, at A5. available at 2001 WL 29760105 ("Analysts who
monitor militias and political movements on America's far right doubt that any known domestic
group was capable of launching the deadly anthrax that left four people de- I and at least 12
others sickened.").
PROXIES FOR LOYALTY
aware of a change in the temper of my thoughts, a greater boldness,
a contempt of danger, a solution of the bonds of obligation. I
looked down; my clothes hung formlessly on my shrunken limbs;
the hand that lay on my knee was corded and hairy. I was once
more Edward Hyde. A moment before I had been safe of all men's
respect, wealthy, beloved ... ; and now I was the common quarry of
mankind, hunted, houseless, a known murderer, thrall to the
gallows.
64
Within Stevenson's novel lies a cautionary tale for us all: the sooner
we realize that each individual, regardless of race and citizenship, has
the capacity for loyalty and disloyalty, the more quickly we will es-
chew both ancient and modern proxies for the same. For this reason, I
join the many post-September 11 voices calling for an end to racial
profiling in the context of terrorism deterrence. Additionally, I leave
you with the following proposal: that Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of
the Constitution be amended to eliminate the distinction between nat-
ural born and naturalized citizens, requiring only that the President be
a "Citizen of the United States. ''6 5
64. ROI)BERT Louis STEVENSON, DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE 82-83 (1994). 1 thank the Rev.
Dr. Timothy Keller. Redeemer Presbyterian Church. for re-introducing me to this novel and its
social justice implications.
65. As mentioned earlier. the only practical limitation to this that I foresee would be ensuring
that some dual citizenship exception be created. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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